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Book Reviews 
Imaginary Rela/iolls: Aesthetics a1ld Ideology i/1 the rl1cory of Historical Maferi-
alislI1 by Michael Sprinker. London and Ne"w York: Verso, 1987. Pp. 302. 
$14.95 (paper). 
Is a general theory of aesthetics incompatible \vilh a thoroughgoing materi-
alist criticism? Some, like Tony Bennett, have surveyed the field of aesthetics 
only to conclude that the category, given its history of metaphysical and epis-
temological affiliations, constitutes little more than "really useless knowl-
edge." On the other hand, Michael Sprinker's recent study, Imagi/wry Rela-
tiolls: Aesthetics al1d Ideology ill the Theory of His/orical MaterialislJ1, attempts 
to recast the problems posed by aesthetic discourse for Marxist analysis, but 
in terms of an Althusserian problematic. 
By rendering the aesthetic a proper theoretical object in the Althusserian 
sense, Sprinker sets out to track the play of an internal discrepency at \Nork 
across a selection of texts in the history of aesthetic discourse from Ruskin 
on, By locating such a displacement, Sprinker hopes to identify those histori-
cal productions of the aesthetic as imaginary relations, following a \\'el1-
known formulation of Althusser's theory of ideology. Sprinker's project in-
volves, in large part, a consideration of the various v',fays in \vhich the "ten-
sion between the aesthetic as a model of transcendental cognitive power and 
the aesthetic as a historical and ideological social practice remains a constitu-
tive and productive feature of Marxist theory down to the present moment" 
(p. 14). The fundamental incompatibility bet\veen the aesthetic understood as 
a species-specific capacity to ground thought in stable intuitions (the legacy 
of Schiller and Kant) and experienced as a "contingent moment in the history 
of understanding" (p, 91) is the source of the theoretical dislocation or di'ca!-
age which, as it \vere, generates the history of aesthetic discourse, a history 
which demands a symptomatic reading of the type formulated by Althusser 
in order to disengage and identify its genuinely materialist component. But 
Sprinker's strategy here is also largely indebted to Paul de Man's analysis of 
the tension between symbol and allegory in literary history as developed in 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality." 
The innatist or epistemological view, characteristic of humanist l'vl<1rxiSITl, 
dr,l\\'s much of its impetus from Marx's own remarks on Greek art at the con-
clusion of the introduction to the Grll11drissc, Here, Marx seems to posit the 
aesthetic as a unh'ersal capacity which suggests, if not rromise~, the tran-
scendence of the alienating everyday conditions of human acti\'it~, and prnd-
uction under capitalism. At this level, Sprinker argues, i\laf'\i~m continue~ to 
image art as a privileged mode of access and simpl~' reproduces one of the 
fundamental tenets of bourgeoi~ aesthetics, But hidden in \\'h.1t h.1~ often 
been disllli%i\'C\y termed "bourgeois aesthetics" is \\'h.]1 Sprinkcr (all~ 
(,lgain. follO\\'ing Althusser) the "rational kernel insidL' the m~'qical "hell pJ 
the l'ourgcois theory of art" (po 15). It is this ration,ll h'rne] \\'hich ()jfns U" 
tIll' p05sil,ility of a (tl llJ1IC l'J'i::lt'llit1ltlSiq!it' \\'ith sllch a traditinn, ,1(((l~din,1..:. t(' 
5prinkt'r, 
r,Ht One ()( [.!U(',';:iI;:'I-.:/ Rc/(;lil'Ji:: ,lltelll}':;:' t() tr,l\'l'r.::l'. In r.:r:. :hl' hl"':()r~; l': 
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bourgeois aesthetics from the mid-nineteenth century onward. In the texts of 
Ruskin l for example, Sprinker locates a contradiction between imagination, 
rooted in a naturalistic theory of mimesis, and allegory, as figural representa-
tion. In a reading much indebted to de Man, he concludes that Ruskin's rum-
inations on the grotesque in tenns of imaginative excess and intrusion finally 
disrupts the unity of signifier and signified, a unity central to any totalizing 
understanding of Ruskin's theoretical project. Ultimately, this privileging of 
allegory over symbol (specifically in the writings on Dante) generates what 
Sprinker calls a "dialectic of non-transcendence," an irresolveable contradic-
tion between Ruskin's mimetic theory of the imagination, outlined most ex-
plicitly in his commitment to the "truth of natural optics" and developed in 
the essays on Turner, and a semiotic theory of representation which postu-
lates "an irreducible heterogeneity between the meaning of signs and their 
phenomenal features" (p. 32). 
This leads Sprinker to conclude, in his symptomatic reading of Ruskin's 
texts, that what presents itself as a unitary theory of aesthetics is based fi-
nally upon the "necessary co-existence of two radically incompatible modes 
of representation, one of which is, paradoxical as this may sound, non-aes-
thetic" (p. 32). This break in Ruskin's seemingly seamless recapitulation of 
bourgeois aesthetics as totalizing and cognitive-here, imaginative-allows 
the materialist kernel to emerge, particularly in one of Ruskin's later charac-
terizations of the artist as akin to a bee building a comb: "But the bee knows 
nothing about [such things as angles]. It builds its comb in a far more inevita-
ble way. And, from a bee to Paul Veronese, all master-workers work with 
this awful, this inspired unconsciousness" (p. 33). This short portrait of artis-
tic production prefigures, according to Sprinker, the mature Marx's notion of 
the subject as a product of history, as well as Althusser's suggestion that ar-
tistic subjects are often little more than the bearers of imaginative structures. 
Sprinker finds a similar set of contradictions at work in the prefaces and 
criticism of Henry James, breaks which render certain totalizing readings 
(specifically those of Blackmur and J. Hillis Miller) untenable in their ordering 
and "aesthetic" impulses. Focussing upon James's notion of revision as writ-
erly effacement (again, shades of de Man), Sprinker takes issue with those 
critics who would find in James's texts either instances of figural totalization, 
on the one hand, or hermeneutic progress, on the other. Likewise, Sprinker's 
subsequent readings of Nietzsche, Hopkins, reception theory, and the critical 
apparatus of the Chicago School (specifically R. S. Crane) all lead him to 
conclude that certain texts are able to yield a genuinely materialist aesthetic 
insofar as they are finally able to resist the totalizing impulse "which is part 
and parcel of the explicit ideology of the aesthetic as an epistemologically re-
liable mode of cognition" (p. 92). 
At the end of chapter five, Sprinker outiines four characteristics of what he 
believes to be a properly materialist theory of art. First, and hearkening back 
to his discussion of Ruskin's occulted materialism, Sprinker argues that the 
human subject is a text which is produced rather than a natural entity "with 
historically invariant features and capacities" (p. 146), a position consistent 
with Althusser's theory of interpellation. Sprinker then offers three additional 
claims which will remain to be tested in part two of ImagillanJ Relatiolls: 1) 
that poetic texts "persist as things (in part) because they are reproduced in 
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the interpretive lahor of readers"; 2) that readers, in turn, "acquire the requi-
site skills to interpret texts by means of institutional apparatuses"; and, 3) 
that these institutional apparatuses "have histories which playa role in and 
are therefore conditioned by the more encompassing history of social forma-
tions ... " (p. 148). 
In keeping with the Althusserian displacement of economism as determi-
nate in the first instance, and the rejection of the notion of expressive totality 
in favor of structural causation (Le., the cause understood as "absent" save 
for the structural articulation of its effects), Sprinker qualifies his third point 
on the coincident histories of institutions and social formations by observing 
that they are not unilaterally determined by, or wholly coincident with, the 
expansion of the forces of production. This grants art, then, a relative-or re-
lational-autonomy with a distinctive time, rhythm, and history of its own. 
This history is not, however, the kind of totalized and teleological history, 
qua historicism, operative in much Marxist theorizing about the arts. 
At this point, Sprinker begins his considerations of Jameson, Sartre, and 
Perry Anderson armed with the Althusserian axiom that history proceeds 
without a subject or goal. He faults Jameson for his somewhat uncritical ap-
propriation of Lukacs's notions of reification and totality, and identifies the 
residual Hegelianism informing much of the agenda of The Political Uncon-
scious with its emphasis upon the "semantic richness" of Marxism as a total-
izing master narrative. This latter claim leads Jameson to a mode of theoreti-
cal pessimism, according to Sprinker, due to his regnant humanism, a hu-
manism so deeply suffused with Sartrean existentialism and voluntarism that 
it can only lead to a ceaseless dialectic between ideology and utopia (p. 174). 
Likewise, Sartre's own attempt to ground history in praxis (understood, in 
the Critique of Dialectical Reason, as the capacity of a historical subject to en-
gage in supersession or depassement) simply reproduces the Hegelian dialectic 
in its continual negation of negation (Le., in memory, transcendence, and an-
ticipation). This, Sprinker opines, merely reinstantiates political programs 
rather than produces strategies for political intervention. Only Marxist ideo-
logical laborers, according to Sprinker, can ultimately provide the masses 
with the necessary (theoretical) tools for intervention for, after all, it is the 
masses who make history. Finally, Sprinker invokes Althusser's oft-neglected 
study, Philosophie spontanee et philosophie spontanee des savants-a text based 
upon a series of lectures given at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1967-68-
in order to counter Perry Anderson's charge that the Althusserian theory of 
ideology is paralyzing in its functionalism. 
Following this extended consideration of current trends in humanist Marx-
ism, Sprinker effects a fascinating rapprochement between two ostensibly ir-
reconcileable figures-Althusser and Paul de Man. As was noted above, de 
Man is a significant presence throughout Imaginary Relations, and Sprinker 
cites several of his essays and studies throughout the ten chapters of the 
book. It is de Man's considerable contribution to rhetorical and textual theory 
which Sprinker often deploys in an attempt to expose the irrepressible nature 
of language as it wells up, in figural frenzy, to subvert all speCUlative totali-
zations. Despite de Man's own rather negative appraisal of Althusser, specifi-
cally in his own reading of Rousseau's Social Contract, Sprinker discovers a 
surprising congruence between Althusser's theory of ideology and de Man's 
understanding of textuality. 
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After a prolonged treatment and comparison of these two texts on Rous-
seau, Sprinker is forced to conclude that, while Althusser's concept of ideol-
ogy and the de Manian "text" share several features, the latter's pantextual-
ism always and already pre-empts the necessary distinction maintained by 
materialist criticlsm between sclence and ideology. While allegories of read-
ing, for de Man, may always narrate the impossibility of reading, they cannot 
expose the "outside"-economic structures as determinate in the last in-
stance. De Man's interpretive interventions will always remain "incomplete/' 
according to Sprinker, insofar as they can never approximate the theoretical 
rigor of a properly symptomatic reading. 
After cutting such a long and erudite path through the often coincldent 
histories of bourgeois and Marxist aesthetics, Sprinker merely returns to Al-
thusser's treatments of Bertolazzi, Brecht, and Leonardo Cremioni. Here, like 
Althusser and Macherey, Sprinker opts for a theoretical middle-ground, plac-
ing art in a position somewhere between science and ideology. A rather 
lengthy, and often suggestive discussion of the problematic relation between 
Vorstellung and Darstellung, recast in terms of "scripting" (as in the scripting 
of a performance, contrary to Jameson's "master narrative") represents 
Sprinker's final attempt to provide a tentative model for history which re-
mains within the field of poetics while, at the same time, supporting Althus-
ser's claim that interpellated subjects are both produced by, and remain bear-
ers of, imaginative structures. 
But Sprinker's conclusions are, in the end, disappointing. The final chapter, 
as provisional and anticipatory as it must be given the Althusserian under-
pinnings of the project, offers little more than theoretical brinkmanship: "We 
must be content here merely to suggest the moment of possible articulation 
in the Althusserian corpus between aesthetic representation and the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge, and to project from this moment some of the 
consequences for a materialist inquiry into the history of aesthetic pro-
duction" (p. 288). One wonders, finally, whether Sprinker's solemnity at this 
juncture is due to his firm belief in an impending ideolOgical crisis in the his-
torical and philological disciplines (n. 12, p. 283), or whether his provisional-
ist impulse has finally caught up with him, rendering Imaginary Relations, 
always and already, a prolegomenon to a prolegomenon ... ad infinitum. 
While alluding to Althusser's Philosophie spontanee, Sprinker also fails to 
engage Perry Anderson genuinely on the issue of Althusser's functionalism. 
This is, perhaps, the weak link in Sprinker's project, and may account for the 
theoretical paralysis of Imaginary Relations. His vanguardist leanings, as well 
as his distrust of populist or punctual politicS (see his stinging denunciation 
of the Democratic Socialists of America, n. 5, p. 211), lead Sprinker to simply 
reinscribe other theoretical totalities lifted uncritically from Althusser, namely 
the "complex social whole" and economism in the last instance. 
In spite of Althusser's recovery of Mao's theory of contradiction and his 
approval of Marx's 1857 rejection of an abstract notion of production, the 
economy remains intact in Althusser's discourse as an abstract universal ob-
ject, an end or telos which structures the social whole by essentially deter-
mining its laws of motion and reproduction. This bears directly upon Sprink-
er's trust in the transformative power of the "masses," his faith in academics 
as a theoretical laboring class, and the unexamined theory of class informing 
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the study overall. While problematizing some totalities, Imaginary Relations 
finally fails to problematize its own, especially as these relate to questions of 
aesthetic production and the relative autonomy of art. 
One wishes that Sprinker had, in fact, actually dealt with the issue of per-
formance and representation only hinted at in the concluding chapters (this 
might have required something of a detour back through Kant and Schiller, 
as well as a thorough treatment of the problem of aesthetic judgement). 
Sprinker also fails to foreground the often interesting tension at work in his 
own study between de Man's treatment of temporality (as it relates to the 
generation of "text") and the Althusserian understanding of history and con-
tradiction. Overall, Imaginary Relations remains uneven and incomplete-an 
often illuminating book much in need of a theoretical coda. 
University of Pennsylvania Gerry O'Sullivan 
New Vieo Studies, Volume III, edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald 
Phillip Verene. New York: The Institute for Vico Studies, 1985. Pp. xi + 252. 
$19.95 (paper). 
Since the inception of the yearbook New VieD Studies, the editors have 
made it their business to publish articles, reviews, abstracts, and notes on 
Giambattista Vico, and to record meticulously in a bibliography or otherwise 
all those textual instances which in some form or another make a mention of 
Vico. In short, they have made it their business to offer a broad variety of all 
kinds of information of interest to Vico scholarship and the present volume 
indicates that they are going to keep it that way. The first 160 pages or so of 
the third volume thus contains no less than 12 articles, and the remaining 
roughly 100 pages are dedicated to reviews, abstracts, reports, and a bibliog-
raphy. So apart from the lengthy lead article, "Toward a History of Recent 
Anglo-American Vico Scholarship, Part III: 1974-1977," authored by one of 
the editors, Giorgio Tagliacozzo, many of the articles are kept in the concise 
form of a 10 to 12 page note, and the subsequent section of abstracts and re-
views etc. registers about 35 additional individual entries. The point of the 
yearbook, then, it seems to me, is not so much to engage in a discussion of a 
specific and or a well delineated problematic in Vico scholarship, but rather 
to welcome exploratory, perhaps conjectural, associative relations between 
Vico and other thinkers, cultivating thereby an almost infinite prolegomenon 
to any future study of Vico. In that New VieD Studies is, compared to other 
yearbooks in philosophy, quite unusual. No doubt, the complexity of the 
Vichian text, the many legal, philosophical, historical, linguistic, anthropolog-
ical, aesthetic issues he raises, and the many disciplines, and critical dis-
courses which can rightly claim him as an inspirational force, all these factors 
lend themselves to view him in multiple lights. So it seems legitimate that 
the present volume focuses on articles which associate Vico with a broad and 
heterogenous range of discourses, with the contemporary logic of Hintikka 
(Horst Steinke), with the philosophy of Susanne Langer (David W. Black), 
with the literary critic Frye (Timothy Bahti), with the symbolic system of Cas-
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sirer (Donald Phillip Verene), with the Rabbinic Tradition (Jose Faur), with a 
philosophy of ethics (Nancy S. Struever), with the literary theories of Bakhtin 
and so forth. 
That so many different quarters have some claim to Vieo in the present 
volume is not a surprise to anyone who has followed the adventures of Vieo 
studies in the Anglo-American world. Heterogeneity is the trademark of Vieo 
scholarship on this side of the ocean, and it seems that it is going to stay that 
way. Yet there is no need to suspect that we have to witness a heuristic tour 
de force. Far from it. For most of these articles are short, introductory, explor-
atory, hypothetical. Some are written under the aegis of a principle of hope: 
"The recent death of Langer will certainly rekindle interest in her important 
philosophy. It is my hope that part of this new research will include a study 
of the relation of her ideas to Vico. Such research would not only be good for 
its own sake; it would also help introduce Langer scholars to VieD, and VieD 
scholars to Langer" (p. 118). Others are premised on the echo-effect: "It is 
the purpose of this paper to present an update on certain aspects of current 
theoretical work in the philosophy of logic that seem to echo a number of 
Vichian lines of thought" (p. 147). And others don't deliver what they prom-
ise. So Nancy S. Struever's "Rhetoric and Philosophy in Vichian Inquiry" is 
not on rhetoric and philosophy in Vico, as the title indicates, but a diatribe 
against Michael Mooney's Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric-in favor of Ber-
nard William's Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. That diatribe is somewhat 
unfortunate, I think, not just because Mooney has presented us with one of 
the few truly integrated books on Vico in English, which in itself is not an in-
significant event, but because Struever's intransigent imposition of a pos't-
Nietzschean masterprogram on Vico does not lead to new, much less radical 
insights into the Vichian text, something Mooney has done, as much as one 
might disagree with his interpretation. Startlingly meager is Struever's textual 
evidence, oversimplified, reductive, and confusing is her use of terminology 
(why presume that "philosophy" in Vico is a construct devoid of natural phi-
losophy, or why presume that some things are ideological and others are not) 
and the self-reflective posture she authoritatively demands-in the traces of 
her master philosophers of pessimism-from all interpretative gestures and 
in particularly from Mooney (but not from Williams) is premised on her own 
totalitarian exclusion from such self-critique. All use of dazzling adjectives 
notwithstanding, to bring Vico in line with the contemporary trend of what 
people like to call an anti-humanist and anti-enlightenment position, to bring 
him in line with an interestingly pervasive belief in pessimism does perhaps 
tell us more about the feeling of powerlessness of large segments of the 
American intelligentsia of the last few decades of the 20th century, living the 
demise of America's geopolitics, than it tells us about Vico's text. And in fact, 
if one feels the need to enlist Vico into a contemporary philosophy of ethics, 
of ethical pessimisms and pessimist ethics, that is, I don't really see why to 
juxtapose Mooney to Williams, and I don't really see what the problem is. 
Both Mooney and Williams are marvelous examples of a civilized adherence 
to the docta of the enlightenment and of the Anglo-American liberal tradi-
tion, though in different configurations, and they both believe, not only the 
Vico scholar Mooney, but in particular and more so the philosopher of ethics 
Williams, contrary to what Struever claims, in the ability of ethics to make a 
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difference, in the ability of the individual to assume a disposition to make a 
choice. And there are certainly passages in Vico's text which fit that bill: 
Scienza nuova (1725), Book Four, p. 305 (Cristofolini edition): "Alia stessa 
fatta si truovano i gradi dell'utilita della sapienza riposta, che deve servire 
alia sapienza volgare, percM ella e nata dalla volgare e per quella medesima 
vive, a fin che la volgare daUa riposta, indebolita, sia retta e sostenuta, ed er-
rante, sia guidata e condotta. TaIche, come i popoli s'appressano 0 si discos-
tana da queste tre massime e come i fuosofi lora assistono 0 l'abbandonano, 
cia sia regola di giudicare dello stato delle nazioni." Yet there are also many 
other passages in Vico's complete works which would not fit that arrange-
ment. That is to say, while Vico is far from primarily ringing the humanistic 
pre-enlightenment bell of democracy and individual freedom, of brother-
hood, equality, and the power of the rhetorical will to run the fate of nations, 
as Mooney would have it, Vico is also far from primarily setting the ultimate 
limits of what can be done, of establishing finite determination, of subverting 
the realm of free will. The problem with the Vichian text is that it does both 
and more, that Vico, for whatever reason, did not, or perhaps could not, or 
did not want to decide for one or the other, for either determination or free 
will, and thus it is simply incorrect to state, as Struever does, that "Vico's 
account of the etiology of social action as a tissue of unintended results, de-
ceptions and self-deceptions, and discursive interstices, subverts the premise 
of voluntarism which assumes the perfect efficacy of the agent's free will 
... " (p. 139). Who, having read the Scienza nuova, can forget the powerful 
passages on the sociality of the golden age of humankind which Vico creates 
on the basis of his analysis of Greek mythology and Roman Law? who can 
forget his evocation of an era when language, poetry, symbolic systems, reli-
gion, rituals, legal systems, political systems came into being? when the he-
roes (or, as Vico also calls them) the first poets, the priests, the sages, the pa-
terfamilias, the first artists, the first scientists, the first astronomers, the first 
lawgivers, the first authorities-and Vico uses all of these appositions and 
more-when the first poets invented symbolic systems to mark the extent of 
their property, their land, and when they invented ever more symbolic sys-
tems to maintain their dominion, in order to mark their difference from the 
ones who did not possess the land, the non-heroes that is. And who can for-
get the passages on the creation of institutions, when the heroes created for 
themselves, but not for the non-heroes, the rights to burial, to religion, and 
to marriage, and when they dispersed discourses concomitant with these 
rights in order to prevent all non-heroes from the claim to participate in these 
institutions, from the claim to knowledge, from the claim to power, and the 
claim to the land. And who can forget how in Vico's story the history of Ro-
man law reflects the moment in which the heroes' poeticity came to an end, 
not because of the heroes' doing, but because of the doing of the innumerous 
famuli, or non-heroes, that social class of no land, of no apparent language, 
no symbolism, no religion, no beauty, no ethics, no knowledge, and no 
power. For when the famuli recognized themselves to be of equal nature to 
the heroes, they ushered in the transformation of the poetic to the prosaic, of 
the pre-rational to the rational, of the few in power to the many in power. 
The human age of humankind had thus begun. No longer were there just 
"Pauci ... quos aequus amavit Jupiter." How that first phase of Vico's de-
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scription of history relates to subsequent phases is one of the many difficul-
ties of Viea's work. It is again related to the problem of free will and determi-
nation and the mandarins of the Vichian establishment here and abroad have 
dedicated to that problem thousands of pages over the past two to two hun-
dred and fifty years. It cannot be worked out on a dozen odd pages or so, as 
Struever would like to do it, and to claim something simply and forcefully 
does not help us much either. What I don't understand is that there seems to 
be too much at stake for some Vichian scholars to opt for one or the other 
when it comes to free will or determination, without taking into account the 
many contradictions and inconsistencies that riddle the Vichian text. So in 
spite of the contemporary lipservice to decentralization and dehierchaliza-
tion, to heterogeneity and multiplicity, to the effacement of totalities and 
continuities, to subversive strategies and the destruction of Western logocen-
tricity, there is an almost pathological anxiety to get the total picture of Vico 
right or wrong, once and for all. And that march into the finite kingdom of 
eternal solutions in Vico scholarship continues under the banner of Vice's 
anti-Cartesianism, and of Vico's isolation in his time-two theses which have 
long been problematized by the international Vico community-and that 
march often clutches tight to the banner of banning any involvement of Vico 
with the natural sciences of his era, the history of science, and the philoso-
phy of science. Certainly, in Struever's case, this should come as no surprise, 
since in her understanding of humanism, philosophy, and rhetoric the natu-
ral sciences do not figure, and as anti-Mooneyian as she would like to be, her 
resistance to relating rhetorics to the problematics of the natural sciences dur-
ing the Renaissance, Vico's age or our own, is a heritage she very much 
shares with Mooney. 
The agenda of New VieD Studies does not enlist a specific item or specific 
problem in Vichian studies that the editors would like to be worked out in 
detail and at length. What the agenda has been and remains is the distribu-
tion of all kinds of knowledge concerning Vico, and the many individual en-
tries no doubt reflect that inclination. That much is readily acknowledged 
and it is certainly very useful for anyone interested in Vieo. What is not that 
readily acknowledged is the anti-historical bias of the editors. Since the in-
ception of something of a wonderful Vico renaissance in the Anglo-American 
academic community, a renaissance which is unthinkable without the organi-
zational skills, the enormous efforts and the unmatched dedication to Vieo of 
one of the editors of the journal under consideration here, Giorgio Taglia-
cozzo, Vico has appeared as a contemporary rather than an eighteenth-cen-
tury thinker, a modernist, and sometimes even a postmodernist, with whom 
to dialogue on a myriad of philosophical and epistemological issues perhaps 
more apposite to our times than to his. It is this conviction, that Vico has 
much to contribute to philosophical issues of our era, which makes the edi-
tors of New Vico Studies purview the horizon of what the philosophical issues 
of our era are. And here it becomes quite interesting: for we are treated to re-
views on all kinds of contemporary thinkers, on Rorty as well as Toulmin, on 
Robert Darnton and Levi-Strauss, on Popper and Megill, on Peter BUrger, 
Mary Douglas, Foucault, and Habermas. I am not going to dwell here on the 
question to which extent Vieo has something substantial or useful to offer to 
these thinkers: Vico is probably flexible enough to accommodate most rela-
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tions of that nature, provided we don't argue all that much on textual 
grounds. What ,the Vichian text could not accommodate, though, are prob-
lems which most of the intellectuals listed above are dealing with, whether 
acknowledged or not by the community which constitutes their discursive 
event: and these problems have to do with the turn the sciences have taken 
towards information systems and information technology. The philosophical 
challenges of our time are deeply linked to problems of the systems of infor-
mation and systems of production, to the relation of the surveillance societies 
to the third world, and I am a bit skeptical as to how much Vico will help us 
to meet these challenges. On the other hand, though, by surveying the state 
of contemporary knowledge in the humanities, the editors have tapped, per-
haps inadvertently, a link which they generally don't emphasize when it 
comes to Vieo: the link between the sciences and the humanities. Of course, 
New VieD Studies does occasionally publish information on Vico and his rela-
tion to the natural sciences, such as Gustavo Costa's review of Paolo Rossi's 
The Dark Abyss of Time (1984), or Badaloni's Introduzione a Vico (1984). Costa 
does, as usual, an outstanding job of focusing on that which is important, of 
explaining the Vichian problems these two extraordinarily credentialled Vico 
scholars are working out-both have written extensively on Vico since the 
early sixties-and it is a pity that not more of that kind of information arrives 
at our shores, that not more of the grand divide between those who see 
"Vico with" and those who see "Vico without nature" reaches our eyes and 
ears. The first step would be to have Badaloni translated, not just the volume 
of 1984 but his earlier Introduzione a Giambattista VieD (1961), a book which 
solidly places Vico in the scientific discourses of his era. And essays by 
Costa, including a new distribution of the ones he has already written, would 
also do well. In the present volume, Costa works at the margins when it 
comes to Vico and the sciences, and the knowledge he has on the subject is 
fragmented between the various reviews. From a Foucaultian point of view, 
such fragmentary sites are not discouraging at all, however, for marginal 
notes can always be added to marginalities. And if Kuhn is right as to how a 
paradigm comes about, if it is correct, as he says in the The Essential Tension, 
that 100 voices can carry the day, then a discourse on Vico and the natural 
sciences might well be about to be born not inspite but because of these 
traces of marginality. That discourse, I am afraid, would not have all that 
much to say about contemporary philosophy at first. It would have to begin 
by returning Vico to where he primarily belongs: to the discourses of Naples, 
Italy, Europe of the early eighteenth century. Yet a lot could be gained by 
such a discursive adventure. For one, it might enlighten us on Vico's partici-
pation in and resistance to many discourses relevant to modernity. And for 
another, it might shed some light on how pro-Cartesian Vieo, and how pre-
Vichian Descartes might have been. And who knows, perhaps it would show 
us that the separation of the humanities and the sciences, so non-negotiably 
proclaimed in recent years whenever the name of Vico orbits the horizon, 
was as much of an ephemeron for his time as it is for ours. 
Skyline College Renate Holub 
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plates. $35.00. 
In The Dark Side of the Landscape John Barrell a decade ago brought into in-
terdisciplinary focus some of the ways in which, to borrow a memorable 
phrase, the shepherds of Arcadia were exchanged for the ploughmen of Eng-
land in British landscape painting. He described how the Claudean glow that 
Wilson and Lambert cast over the native scene during the mid-eighteenth 
century was gradually clarified in the detailed gaze of Gainsborough, Mor-
land, and Constable, so that in a phenomenon paralleled by the pastoral and 
georgic of literature and dictated by cultural laws of supply and demand the 
dim figure of the rural laborer could emerge ever so slowly from the painted 
ground of the English countryside. Barrell concluded that the decade most 
central to the change in sensibility was the 17905, when nationalism and war 
with France spurred the Royal Academy to encourage the representation of 
traditional rural occupations. Not until the following decade did the artist 
who closed Barrell's survey, Constable, wean landscape from the false con-
sciousness of arcadianism in anticipation of the aesthetics of social realism. 
Although Barrell was clearly impatient with the pace of the social changes he 
described and often stepped away from the painting to make his point, the 
movement of his brief study distilled from the development of British land-
scape art a limited progress in both the modern and historical sense of the 
word. 
In her recent book Ann Bermingham covers much the same territory with 
much the same marxisant perspective. Bermingham also concentrates on 
Gainsborough and Constable and locates a paradigmatic shift in the 1790s, 
which she calls the picturesque decade. Because the terms of her discussion 
are so novel and complex, however, especially in the treatment of Constable 
and the picturesque, the argument of Landscape and Ideology takes the socio-
historical consideration of the artwork into a dimension as yet unrealized by 
other studies. The gains of the approach are both intrinsic and extrinsic; they 
allow landscape to say many things at once, dialogically, about the artwork, 
the artist, the countryside, and the otherwise less visible social relations 
which art helps to shape. There are also costs involved. Where Barrell points 
us implicitly towards William Morris, Bermingham extends the scope of her 
study through the suburban landscapes of Ford Madox Brown, and hints at a 
link between the development of Milton Abbas and the Thatcherite planning 
of a Milton Keynes. Where Barrell locates in Constable an epistemological 
turn from an illusory to a progressive mode of depiction, Benningham under-
stands the investments of Constable in the picturesque to be just as illusion-
ary, finally, as those of his predecessors in the genre. In other words, the 
shift in emphasis from the illusory subject matter of pastoral to an illusionary 
medium charged with contradictory personal, professional, and social ideolo-
gies lends the study of landscape a certain social pessimism as well as an un-
expected challenge and interest. 
If the juxtaposition of two such fine critics and historians seems unfair it 
should be said that Bermingham often engages Barrell directly or indirectly 
during the course of her argument, and that her study begins where his 
Criticism, Vol. XXX, No.3: Book Reviews 409 
leaves off, in the definition of nature. The central critical term in Landscape 
and Ideology names a complicated intertwining of nature with culture. The 
naturalization of the sign is the "implicit derivation of social convention, prac-
tice, and attitudes from the natural structure of the world." An alfresco con-
versation piece from 1757, for instance, demonstrates how "a subjected na-
ture refers to culture because nature is part of a pictorial code that tells the 
viewer that the subjects of the painting enjoy a certain status, that they pos-
sess both property and taste; at the same time, a subordinate culture refers to 
nature for its ultimate justification .... Thus nature signifies class while class 
signifies a universal, classless nature" (p. 15). The designation naturalization 
develops the notion grounded both in the post-structuralist arbitrariness of 
the sign and in the psychology of perception popularized by E. H. Gombrich 
that the artwork necessarily represents representation rather than nature, 
which can never be seen for itself in art. The remainder of the term refines 
the semiotic lesson that painting is a double sign in which meaning is consti-
tuted by the alternate fore grounding of social and aesthetic values. The mor-
phology of landscape involves a double articulation in which distinctive nat-
ural units of the genre like trees, terrain, and water are defined in terms of 
the distinctive social units of individuals, dwellings, and occupations, and 
vice versa. Mediating between the two is -the landscape garden, where the 
worked surface is of course the land itself. Sometimes signifier and some-
times signified, the naturalized landscape painting is both the screen onto 
which social and aesthetic values are projected and the commodity through 
which they are expressed. In a way that can be likened to the period defense 
of subordination by appeal to the great chain of being the depiction of an 
apparently natural division of labor comes to stand for the (un)natural class 
structures of society at large. 
After the introduction an initial chapter, "The State and Estate of Nature," 
applies and extends the concept of the naturalized sign to social gesture in 
outdoor conversation pieces by Zoffany, Mercier, and Gainsborough by plac-
ing the iconography of the pose against the normative codes of illustrated eti-
quette books. Bermingham then goes on to consider Gainsborough's role in 
pioneering and abandoning the rustic landscape. The chapter treats in espe-
cially convincing detail the well-known Mr. and Mrs. Robert Andrews, a paint-
ing unusual for Gainsborough and one which for Bermingham represents a 
false step in the development of landscape painting, like the ferme ornee in 
landscape gardening. Each was rendered unpopular by the explicit presence 
of labor, according to Bermingham. Abandoning the conversation piece, 
Gainsborough went on to domesticate the empirical gaze of Dutch landscape 
in the woods and lanes of East Suffolk, inventing the English rustic land-
scape. Because his own native environs had been divided since the sixteenth 
century into small tracts, Gainsborough could ignore for the most part the 
single most important social fact which the century brought to bear on the 
countryside, large-scale enclosure. Here Bermingham arrives at the intersec-
tion most crucial for her study, that of individual psychology and a socially 
determined aesthetic horizon: the alienation of Gainsborough from both rus-
tic values and the truth-telling role he assigned to landscape becomes visible 
in the late turn through voyeurism toward "explicitly sentimental" (p. 52) 
paintings of childlike innocence. Summary account actually does little justice 
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to the subtle interweaving of social, political, and psychological threads of 
historical interest throughout the chapter. 
In her second chapter Bermingham takes up the burgeoning of the pictur-
esque in the last decade of the century as contextual prelude for her discus-
sion of Constable in the third. The term picturesque signified both an appre-
ciation of the visual potential of a countryside increasingly subject to urban 
demands and the legacy of rustic landscape painting left by Gainsborough; 
each definition answered to the other, for a picturesque landscape was one 
suitable for painting, and a picturesque painting was a landscape faithful to 
the countryside it depicted. As if to underscore the point, Bermingham quotes 
the literature of travel to show that travellers came to see the countryside 
through the eyes of Gainsborough. In appreciative responses like Reynolds's 
in his fourteenth discourse Gainsborough was generally understood to be a 
new sort of artist, one who had taken his inspiration directly from the genius 
loci. Naturalized through the picturesque, however, the range of response to 
landscape painting was more complicated than that: writers on the pictur-
esque could follow Edmund Burke in stressing its empirical sources, as Wil-
liam Gilpin did; or they could center the picturesque aesthetic in the conserv-
ative politics of estate gardening, with Uvedale Price; or like Richard Payne 
Knight, applying the associationism of Archibald Alison, they could place the 
picturesque within the realm of mental perception. Each point of view gives a 
particular ideological spin to the difference between a natural and an arti-
ficial picturesque. The net effect of the theory of the picturesque was to "ex-
tend ... naturalization to ... art criticism" (p. 60), while the popular cult of 
the picturesque served mainly to romanticize the English countryside before 
enclosure and to disguise the historical effects of social change. Bermingham 
thus understands the picturesque sensibility to be imbued with elitism, nos-
talgia, and pessimism: the worker who emerges from the art of the 1790s cel-
ebrates mainly the success of the enclosure movement, which by the turn of 
the century had brought into production more than two million acres. Ber-
mingham quotes contemporary documents extensively and convincingly to 
show just how intensely alienated farm workers became as agriculture 
shifted from a "labor-intensive to a capital-intensive pursuit" (p. 76). The 
discussion is probably the best account of the picturesque and its political 
implications now available. 
The centerpiece of the book is the consideration of Constable, who was 
heir to all the contradictions of rustic landscape and who, in Bermingham's 
absorbing account, eventually came to ambivalent personal terms with them 
before making the genre an outsized impossibility. Bermingham first remarks 
upon the timeliness of an amply documented artistic career, one which wit-
nessed in the full industrialization of the economy, increasing class con-
sciousness, and Luddite riots an extraordinary degree of social transforma-
tion. The narrative then goes on to discuss several dimensions of Constable's 
complex personality as the artist found his way among the traditions he 
chose to work in. For Bermingham Constable reveals in his always autobio-
graphical rustic views a continuing streak of initial avoidance and eventual 
approach; he rejected his father's trade as mill operator and married the 
daughter of his father's enemy, for instance, only to assimilate the mill and 
its surroundings again and again into his painting and to adopt his father's 
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paternalism in his own life as husband and father. His response to the pictur-
esque likewise constituted an anti-political politics. 
The notion of the picturesque that persists in the nineteenth century is the 
materially-based associationism of Knight. In "Mapping the Self" Ber-
mingham argues that Constable unconsciously substituted personal senti-
ment for the recognition that his father's mills and locks were property pure 
and simple. His emotional investment was in part guaranteed by a veiled 
awareness of the difference between the propertied and non-propertied 
classes, but there was also an "Oedipal legacy" (p. 129) to deal with. 
Through his novel use of the plein air oil sketch, Constable transmuted both 
class consciousness and his father's holdings into a preliminary personal be-
holding in which conflicting emotions could be sorted out before being made 
public. In something of the same way that Gainsborough used the vignette, 
Constable used the preparatory sketch to suggest, misleadingly, a "com-
pletely personal fusion" (p. 129) with landscape, a retrospective naturaliza-
tion of the sign that asked the viewer to collude with the artist in a sense of 
personal loss. Bermingham illustrates her argument not only with the five oil 
sketches titled Flalford Mill from the Lock (pp. 130-34) and the completed 
painting they were shaped into, A Water Mill, exhibited at the Royal Acad-
emy in 1812 (pI. 4), but also with Constable's letters to his fiancee, Maria 
Bickell, who had earlier sketched the same view. The result is a tour de force 
of critical analysis, uncovering layer by layer the texture of emotional in-
volvement in the painting. The discussion of the Academy six-footers that 
follows is a worthy pendant. 
After the Constables were married they moved to Hampstead and in her 
last chapter, "Middle Grounds and Middle Ways," Bermingham follows them 
to the suburbs. By the mid-nineteenth century the naturalization of the sign 
shifted from "an imperative cultural confusion to a confused cultural impera-
tive" (p. 158), meaning that the uniform values that the propertied classes 
projected onto landscape became at once more general among the English 
and less uniformly capitalist. The middle class began to cast upon the coun-
tryside a scientific and recreational gaze that could only wither the rustic 
landscape. Bermingham notes that for Brown the suburban landscape paint-
ing was a potboiler, a distraction from Victorian history paintings like his 
Work and The Last of England, and that for his contemporary John William 
Inchbold it was largely an experiment in minute observation. The narrative of 
landscape finally tells an incidental story of diversion or states flatly the re-
sults of placing nature under a microscope. 
This reader has a few related reservations about Bermingham's study, 
amounting to a large question. The analogy between landscape and history 
painting raised in the discussion of Brown might have been explored in more 
detail throughout the book, especially since it also surfaces in quotations at 
several earlier junctures (e.g. pp. 43, 58, 62, 95), once with a vengeance (p. 
70). Geertz's notion of ideology understands it to function in a cultural sys-
tem of implicit generic interplay. As brilliant as Bermingham is on the defini-
tion of picturesque, preliminary terms like iconoclastic (meaning innovative) or 
empirical (meaning illusory) fare less well, a bit oddly in this last instance 
since Bermingham's is a densely and eloquently empirical project. Closer to 
home, Bermingham is surely correct to say that "Constable would have been 
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incapable of criticizing the plight of the laborer in an industrialized, capitalist 
economy" (p. 144), but the claim that Constable was anti-political needs 
qualification. Recognizing that Wordsworth harvested images as political si-
lage for his poetry, Constable wrote an 1835 sonnet to Wordsworth calling 
him a second Milton. In it he urged Wordsworth to maintain the national 
cause and ended by saying that he himself would keep faith in English free-
dom 
While lays like thine are framed to glad the strong 
And give the lowly surest hope from wrong. 
Sentiments like these offer more than a purely personal politics, and partici-
pate in the Lockean discourse of liberty that Barrell has seen subsumed in the 
discourse of civic humanism. What then can landscape tell us about the Eng-
lish ideology that a transplanted and abstracted history painting must of ne-
cessity remain mute about? 
In consequence of her magnificent achievement in Landscape and Ideology, 
questions like these will now have to be referred to Ann Bermingham. Beau-
tifully written and nicely paced, her study has several local virtues: an inge-
nious use of Roland Barthes paralleled in gender studies only by Unda Kauff-
man; the creation in Constable of a cautious iconoclast as original as Svetlana 
Alpers's entrepreneurial Rembrandt; and a period eye as finely attuned to 
nuances of value as Michael Baxandall's is to quotidian epistemology. The 
larger excellence of her study is its conviction that neither the work nor the 
art of the artwork is immune to the concerns of politics. 
Rutgers University Timothy Erwin 
